Geopolitical Value of the US dollar and Peripheral Countries by Nacht, Pablo Alejandro - Autor/a
SOUTH-SOUTH 
COLLABORATIVE 
PROGRAMME
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
CODESRIA
Geopolitical Value of the 
US dollar and Peripheral 
Countries
Pablo Alejandro Nacht
CLA
#3
This paper was originally presented to the Summer Institute on “International Hegemony and the South: A Tricontinental Perspective”, 
Havana, Cuba, 2005. The event was organized by “The Africa, Asia and Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Program”, supported 
by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
The opinions expressed in this document, which has not been submitted to editorial revision, are the exclusive responsibility of the 
author and they do not necessarily agree with the position of CLACSO/CODESRIA/APISA.
Copyright 2008 The Africa-Asia-Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Program.
International hegemony and the south
ISBN: 978-987-1183-88-3
Patrocinado por
Agencia Sueca de Desarrollo Internacional
CLACSO
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - Conselho Latino-americano de Ciências Sociais
Av. Callao 875 | piso 5º “J” [recepción] | C1023AAB | Buenos Aires | Argentina
Tel [54 11] 4811 6588 | Fax [54 11] 4812 8459
e-mail <clacso@clacso.edu.ar> | web <www.clacso.org>
Geopolitical Value of the 
US dollar and Peripheral 
Countries
Pablo Alejandro Nacht
CLA
#3
5OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
Objetive
This research aims at exploring political as well as economic positioning strate-
gies, which would allow Southern countries (Latin America, Africa and Asia) to 
learn and analyse the past and present situation of the world economic system 
and its potential risks in order to find a possible counter-hegemony alternative.
US Dollar Hegemonic Role and South Countries
Deep changes took place after World War II; the US emerged as the strongest 
economic and military power. The Bretton Woods agreement (1944) was vital 
for the rise of the US, since the US dollar became the principal reserve currency 
and the global economic world became dependent on it. During the fifties its 
hegemony was unquestionable.
The collapse of the Soviet bloc led to a series of highly significant events: 
the strengthening of capitalistic trade blocs, a unipolar world in which the USA is 
the sole superpower, the revolution in Science and Technology and the deteriora-
tion of developing countries due to the implementation of neoliberal policies.
However, Bretton Woods set up a system of fixed exchange rates using 
the US dollar as a reserve currency. This was possible due to the overwhelming 
strength of post-war North American capitals. Thus, while the dollar was backed 
by the gold standard, other countries had to peg their local currencies to the 
dollar according to a fixed exchange rate.
Consequently, the dollar played a double role, since it was both a domestic 
and an international currency. USA credit inflation landed in the international 
market, producing instability; through its deficit, the US determined the level of 
international liquidity. The collapse of the system established in Bretton Woods 
was inevitable.
In August 15, 1971, Mr. Nixon, by then President of USA, unilateraly, closed 
the gold window, making the dollar convertible to gold directly and setting up 
a new exchange rate system which had a substantial impact upon the world 
economic politics1. This system allowed the US to issue dollars without gold 
backing; the velocity of circulation of the US currency increased and it became 
volatile. The unilateral cavalier way in which the Bretton Woods inspiring princi-
ples were cast aside, was well captured in the phrase used by Nixon’s Secretary 
of the Treasury, John Connolly, about the international impact: “our currency, 
but your problem”.
1 By removing the gold backing in 1971 the US had a current account deficit in its balance of trade of 145 billion 
dollars; in 2004 it amounted to 617 billions.
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As Theotonio Dos Santos states: “The military confrontation between the 
US and Vietnam was another important factor involving an intensification of public 
sector expenditure in the period 1967-73. Military expenditure took on a new 
dimension in this period. The progress of military technology hugely increased 
the cost of military equipment and R&D in this sector […] Expenditure on pure 
research took on the guise of great projects of the eighties, known as the “Great 
Science”, (the Star Wars Program or the Strategic Military Initiative, the Genome 
Project, the giant particle accelerator, etc. […] The emergence of petrodollars in 
the seventies generated a great excess of funds in the global financial system, 
which was recycled primarily through the North American financial system and 
secondarily through the European system. This recycling was initially directed 
to the countries of the Third World and to socialist countries, which took on 
enormous foreign debts in the nineteen seventies” (2004:5).
Surrealistic Economy
In spite of its importance since the seventies, in 1990 there were massive inflows 
and outflows of speculative capital, which played a fundamental role in the world 
economy. Overall, the volume of the financial Economy was fifty times larger 
than the real economy. Thus, we could say that the international Economy was 
private, speculative, unstable and pro – American2. The US dollar was not only 
the most common reserve currency, but it was also the favorite speculative 
currency, the refuge currency against the ups and downs of speculation. On 
the one hand, the US government issued its currency without external controls, 
and, on the other hand, it could be bought in any place of the world.
In 1975 the buying –selling process of foreign currencies as a means of 
payment for the acquisition of goods or services, that is, for international trade, 
accounted for an 80 % of the total global currency market activity. The other 
20% accounted for exchange speculation, which traditionally used to play a 
minor role in currency transactions. Twenty years later the scenario changed 
radically. By then, 97.5% accounted for speculative manoeuvres and only 2.5% 
represented real goods and services transactions (next page).
By the mid-ninenties, the financial economy overall involved 50 times more 
money than the real economy. International reserves became insignificant in 
comparison to the extraordinary power of private money; the movement of not 
2 Hedge funds, which were launched in the fifties, must be taken into account. Theoretically, the goal of these 
funds was to provide the market a tool able to diversify and reduce risks, but, in fact, they have since been 
operating as a mechanism for high risk speculative manouevres; by betting on the future development of a 
variety of financial assets, thus obtaining small profit margins through transactions involving colossal amounts, 
and the capacity of circulating external resources throughout short periods of time. All this allows to obtain 
astronomical profits at low-cost investment.
 Nowadays, 3,000 institutions manage this type of funds worldwide.A present case illustrates very clearly the 
range that these institutions can reach: Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), one of the most important hedge 
fund enterprise in USA, ran by a group of financial gurus (including two Nobel Prize Laurates in Economics). This 
company developed creative mathematic techniques ( set up prices of the options) and operated sophisticated 
computer softwares; during 4 years it was able to achieve almost a 50% profit margin for its investors.
 The Press has informed that at the beginning of 2006, this company moved a capital of nearly 5 billion dollars. 
This fund moved an amount higher than 200 billion dollars in this type of transactions (40 to 1 scale).
 The devaluation of the ruble brought serious difficulties to LTCM, including a scenario of potential bankruptcy. 
In order to prevent this, the Federal Reserve had to urgently set up a plan, a rescue package of 370 billion 
dollars, involving foreign banks and 15 major US banks.This behaviour of the Federal Reserve is certainly dif-
ficult to understand and provoked major protests in and outside the country. USA demanded both in Russia 
and the Southeast to leave up to the market the task of determining which company was capable of carry on 
operating and which had to go bankrupt. It was the same USA, adopting a different philosophy, the one who 
got involved to save a troubled company at home.
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more than 2% of the private financial flow was able to modify the exchange rate 
between two currencies.
Every 3 years the BIS (Bank for International Settlements, based in Basel) 
coordinates a global central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives 
market activity. For example: in 2001 the foreign exchange and derivatives “Forex” 
amounted to 4 million million dollars per day, which represented the performance 
of the global NIP during one week.
Considerable investments caused a private financial flux, which the in-force 
controls were not able to handle. In 1964, international private loans accounted 
only for the 20% of the international reserves; in 1970 this flux surpassed the 
reserves and by 1980 it was nearly double.
As Patnaik marked “Financial interests within any country, as Keynes and 
Kalecki argued, tend to be hostile to demand management; when finance is 
international, this hostility acquires a spontaneous effectiveness. Any effort by 
the state to expand economic activity makes speculators apprehensive about 
inflation, exchange rate depreciation and, more generally, political radicalism and 
finance flows out of the country; this precipitates actual depreciation and inflation, 
forcing the state to curtail activity so that speculators feel comfortable. The cur-
rent imperialist offensive against the third world, in the form of the imposition of 
liberalization, has to be understood in this context […] Liberalization, in short, is 
a mechanism for centralization of capital on a world scale: metropolitan capital-
in-production ousts third world producers, while metropolitan capital-as-finance 
(which is the dominant component of globalized finance) gets control over third 
world resources and enterprises (built up earlier at public cost) at throwaway 
prices. Prying open third world markets to goods and services helps overcome 
metropolitan stagnation. Doing so, moreover, is particularly advantageous, for 
two reasons: first, it keeps state intervention in demand management at bay, 
and with it any threat of political radicalism; second, by deindustrializing the 
third world and forcing it into greater reliance on primary production, it keeps 
inflationary pressures in the metropolis in check” (2005: 10).
Finance Especulation - Real Economy
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Under these circumstances, the incidence of the financial ups and downs 
had strong repercussions, such as the pushing of the real economy into the back-
ground. The global economy was now dependant on the US economic cycle.
US trade deficit continues to set new records: in 2004 it reached the 
unprecedented figure of 617 billion dollars, 24.4 % larger than in 2003, when 
the imbalancement accounted for 496 billion dollars. It is the third succesive 
record deficit.
But this is not really new. The current account deficits of the United States 
have been the rule for most of the past three decades, with only a brief period 
of balance, and have risen rapidly since 2000 to a record deficit that is higher 
than $600 billion. As a result, the United States, the world’s largest economy, 
has accumulated net international debts of about $3 trillion, making it the world 
largest debtor. These changes in national holdings of international assets are 
both a counterpart to the current-account imbalances and their mirror image, 
as reflected in national differences between savings and investment.
The external deficit of the United States corresponds to a shortfall of its 
savings in relation to its investment and surpluses of savings over investment 
elsewhere, with the United States absorbing at least 80 % of the savings that 
other countries do not Invest domestically.
The rest of the world needed the United States to run balance-of-payment 
deficits in order to provide the additional liquidity necessary to fuel continued 
world economic growth. However, when the deficit of the United States rose, the 
excess supply of dollars eroded confidence in the value of the dollar, weakening 
its foundation as the world reserve currency.
As the issuer of international reserve money, the United States is able to 
have persistent external deficits and to finance them in its own currency, with 
virtually no need for foreign exchange reserves. By facing external constraints 
that are more limited than those of other countries, if it deems necessary, the 
United States can adopt policies that are more stimulatory than those of other 
countries. In contraposition, most of the other countries, particularly developing 
countries, have to use the dollar and other international currencies, rather than 
their own national currencies, in their international transactions and as a means 
United States current-account deficit, 1970-2004
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of accumulating foreign exchange reserves; their capacity to run external deficits 
is constrained by their supply of foreign exchange and their access to global 
credit markets, both of which are limited.
Despite its position as a net international debtor, the United States con-
tinues to have a positive net inflow of investment income from abroad… for the 
time being.
Historically, adjustments to the large external deficits of the United States 
have involved considerable volatility in foreign exchange and world financial 
markets and a contractionary effect on both the United States and the global 
economy. In the early seventies, adjustments led to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system and the transition to a floating exchange-rate system. During 
the eigthies, when the United States faced twin fiscal and external deficits, in 
1985 the adjustment had involved a sharp fall in the value of the dollar. Until the 
current account was rebalanced in 1991, the dollar declined by about 40 % 
against a basket of other major currencies.
Today’s global imbalances have become larger and lasted longer than in 
the 1980s. Increasing global economic integration, particularly deepening global 
financial integration, have made current imbalances different from those of the 
seventies and eighties in terms of their sustainability and their implications for the 
world economy. As the imbalances continue to increase, the risks of an abrupt 
and disordered reversal also rise, suggesting risks of larger adjustment costs 
for the world economy in the future. In turn, continued reserve accumulation by 
some Asian and world central banks allows the United States to rely on domestic 
demand to lead its growth and to run the resulting large current-account defi-
cits. After a decline from 70% in the 1960s to almost 50% in the early nineties, 
the share of United States dollar assets in total world official holdings of foreign 
exchange has rebounded to about 64%; the share of the euro remains less than 
20% and that of the Japanese yen less than 5%.
Share of national currencies in identified official holdings 
of foreign exchange, end of year,a 1994-2003
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Three features may cause the rising United States current account deficit to 
become unsustainable in the next few years. First, the deficit is financing con-
sumption rather than investment; second, the United States investment is shifting 
towards nontradable sectors; and third, the deficit is increasingly being funded 
by short-term flows. In addition, the financing needed by the United States to 
sustain its deficits has been provided by the world central banks, not by private 
investors, during certain recent periods.
World Economic System Stress
One of these sources of instability is the tension between the growing need of 
the United States for financing to cover its current account and fiscal deficits 
and the losses that those lending to the United States in dollars are almost 
certain to incur in. There are also concerns that rising trade deficits will lead 
to protectionist pressures; signals of a new burst of protectionism are already 
apparent. These growing signals that the system is under stress raise doubts 
that the present massive rate of reserve accumulation will continue for an 
extended period.
The fact that the effects of dollar depreciation are also adverse for those 
holding dollar assets is likely to reduce their expenditure, particularly where those 
assets are held by private agents (all World Central Banks).
“Dollar reserves earn a pittance and sooner or later the holders of such 
reserves would wish to trade them for more lucrative assets. Allowing such a shift 
would entail a denationalization of American assets which the U.S. State would 
be opposed to; on the other hand, not allowing such a shift would jeopardize 
the position of the dollar and plunge the U.S. economy, and indeed the system 
as a whole, into a profound crisis. Therefore, the U.S. cannot be unconcerned 
about its growing external debt. But each of the policy options available to it is 
fraught with serious consequences”. (Patnaik, 2005: 9)
The Euro has begun to emerge as a serious challenge to the US dollar 
privilege, thus the American interest towards the implementation of the FTAA 
agreement as an integration project.
The US relative weakening of economic leadership worldwide plus the 
strengthening of the EU and the growing and threatening China-Japan com-
petitiveness in Asia has led the US to redesign its foreign policy, in order to 
counterbalance to the EU and the Asian Pacific rim.
Petrodollars vs. Petroeuro
Oil determines the European strategy to compete with the US dollar. At the end 
of year 2000, Irak started pricing the international transactions in euro. Jordan 
and Irak created a bilateral trading system also with a euro standard. North 
Korea and Iran have adopted the European currency since December 2002, 
while Russia, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela are analyzing the same 
stance. Yavad Yayani, influential Chief of OPEC Oil Market Analysis Department 
has advised: “As long as bilateral trading between the Middle East and the EU 
keeps increasing, oil could be quoted in euro considering that Europe is the 
main economic partner in the region”.
The question is: what would happen if oil were quoted in euro instead of 
US dollars?
According to the Financial Times, Saudis who owned assets in the US 
for 700 billion dollars have already withdrawn 10 billions. A weak dollar causing 
internal distrust could generate 9 billion dollars to be switched to the European 
currency and non monetary assets such as gold.
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As it has been described, the European currency has become a great 
financial weapon in the world economic scenario. Thus threatening the US 
dollar hegemony.
Therefore, it seems particularly suggestive that these facts are widely ignored, 
in particular, by the American news media who regards China and the OPEC as the 
bicausality for the increase in crude oil prices. Moreover, specialized publications 
not only omit the deterioration of the US dollar, but also the fact that the USA is 
transfering inflation to world markets due to the devaluation of its currency.
The increase in the price of crude 
oil (setting new records by now), ce-
ment, tin, iron, and innumerable com-
modities can not be simply explained 
by China’s demand or the unceasing 
tensions in the oil-producing regions. 
Raw materials adjust their prices, part-
ly, as a consequence of the deprecia-
tion of the currency which determines 
its value in the global market.
Oil prices increased throughout 
most of the year amid considerable 
volatility. The price of Brent crude oil 
reached a peak of USD 51 at the end 
of October 2005, compared with USD 
30 at the beginning of 2005 (see Chart 
3). For the whole of 2004, the average 
price of Brent crude oil was USD 38. 
33 % above the average of 2003. If 
measured in terms of euro, the price 
of Brent crude oil increased by 20 % 
over the same period.
 As the Annual European Central 
Bank Report 2004 informed: “On aver-
age, the price of Brent crude oil in 2004 was 33 % higher than in 2003. Nonethe-
less, as a result of the overall appreciation of the euro against the US dollar, oil 
prices in euro terms went up by 20 % in 2004”.
Second, indirect effects refer to 
the possibility that, in addition to di-
rect effects, by increasing energy input 
costs, an oil price shock may have an 
impact on the prices of other goods 
and services. This may result in a gen-
eralised rise in prices, although it also 
depends on the extent to which profit 
margins can absorb rising costs. There 
are primarily two channels through 
which oil price shocks affect the real 
economy. First, there is the supply-side 
channel, because oil is an important input factor in the production process. A rise 
in the price of oil entails, particularly in the short term, an increase in production 
costs, as the options for substituting other energy sources for oil are limited. 
The level of output may fall as a result of the oil price increase, which may also 
imply lower demand for other production factors such as labour. Second, on 
the demand side, an increase in oil prices entails a deterioration in the terms of 
trade of net oil-importing economies. That´s why oil prices and their variation 
have sustantive importance in world prices all over the world.
Main developments in commodity markets
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Increases in Brent crude oil prices 
over specific periods
(percentage change of the annual overage)
1973-1974 1978-1979 1999-2010 2003-2004
in USA 204 204 60 33
in EUR 210 110 34 20
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
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The importance of a different approach
For the above-stated reasons, it is essential for the national and regional devel-
opment of Latin America, Africa and Asia to counterbalance the suppositions 
and “truths” showed by hegemonic trends. This can be achieved through the 
analysis of our realities, involving regional particularities, intraregional power 
distribution, subregional interests, endogenous economic levels of development, 
pending conflicts, democratization, historical legacy, ideological traditions and 
cultural and religious patterns.
Presently, the media3 and the main academic trends show a neutral reality 
or a fictitious suppression of right or left stances, drawing a veil of objectivity 
over the reality that affects each country. These acritical approaches towards an 
economy that disregards the social and productive considerations are building a 
virtual scenario, where the movement of money alone generates more money.
J. M. Keynes’ remark was really relevant: “Speculators may not be harmful 
when they are only bubbles in a company with a firm spiritual stream; the situation 
is serious when the company becomes a bubble within the whirl of speculation. 
When the development of a country’s capital becomes a subproduct of activities 
typical of a gambling casino, the process will eventually go wrong.”
The worship of financial speculation together with the existance of the 
so-called “natural” rules, therefore unchangeable as society and history are 
ignored into oblivion, subordinate countries and policies with an obscene power. 
Developed countries are able to face these barriers from a stronger position 
than peripheral countries4.
Countries used to trade one with the other; presently they are obliged to 
trade with transnationals5, which have increased their power.
The multiplication of money and its profits, smelling of financial bubbles, 
shows the instability of the Global Economic System. Three days of financial 
transactions account for a full year of goods and services transactions.
The strength of these financial manouvres have produced shocks almost 
in every country, with a deeper impact on small and medium ones. The Asian 
Tigers Crisis is a clear example of this6. 
The alleged rationality of the economic and financial system for the short 
term will prove suicidal in the medium and long term.
On the other hand, the manouvering margin of the Nation-State is under-
mined by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) since they regulate financial 
assistance or make it conditional on the implementation of models or economic 
and political recipes. These openings for business undermine the development of 
local industries, creating a “new market” where transnationals companies find a 
niche to increase their profit margin7. In this way, as Carlos Taboada and Wim Dier-
3  Regarding the North-South gap between the cultural and News Media availability, we must be aware that only 
3 agencies from developed countries are the source from where the 80% of the global public information 
comes from : Associated Press (USA), Reuters (Great Britain), Agence France Presse (France).
4 For example, the United States is able to have persistent external defi cits and to fi nance them in its own cur-
rency. By facing external constraints that are more limited than those of other countries, if it deems necessary 
the United States can adopt policies that are more stimulatory than developing countries.
5 Notice that I use the generic term transnational, and not multinational, due to the fact that transnationals do 
have nationality and their local governments take responsibility through their politicians, armies and other 
governmental agencies.
6  Deregulation, speculation and the whole performance of the neoliberal package have caused 150 financial 
crises worldwide, involving 70 countries. In all cases, the actual winners have been the transnationals- mainly 
from USA -, and the transnationalised banks, assisted by the IMF and the World Bank.
7 Standard economic theory argues that international private capital flows will make a major contribution to 
development to the extent that they will flow from capital-abundant industrialized countries to capital-scarce 
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ckxsens have clearly stated: “[…] the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) were 
conceived to assure that the South countries honoured their debts to the Northen 
countries. The World Bank became a colossal collection office” (2005:12).
In 1988 the IMF created the Adjusted Structural Service (ASS) and in 1987 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment (ESA), both coordinated by the IMF. Tran-
snational investment allocates 90% of its resources to the merger and acquisition 
of existing companies, and only a 10% to the creation of new facilities or the 
expansion of the production capacity. This is, for each 10 dollars in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), only one is used for production and for the creation of jobs.
Naom Chomsky clearly defined the role of the IMF, the World Bank and other 
international institutions, when he said: “No one advocates for free trade unless 
they already know they will win the competition”. In that sense, multilateral trade 
negotiations, agricultural markets remain highly distorted. Liberalization has been 
modest. Developed countries often impose lower tariffs than developing countries 
- not only on agricultural but also on industrial products - and tariffs applied on 
traditional agricultural exports by developing countries are either zero or minimal. 
However, the fact that tariffs usually increase with the level of processing helps 
to discourage higher value - added activities in developing countries or on those 
products (for example, fruits and flowers) that have faster growth potential.
Products sheltered by high tariffs often receive domestic support and 
require export subsidies to be placed in international markets. Producer sup-
port reached about $ 257 billion dollars on 32% of the total farm receipts in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
countries in 2003.
The trade of less developed countries is particularly affected by OECD agricul-
tural subsidies: over 18% of their exports, on average, are products receiving 
domestic support by at least one of their World Trade Organization partners. 
developing countries and help to smooth expenditure throughout the business cycle in capital-recipient 
countries. In recent years, reality has contradicted both aspects of this standard theory. For the last seven 
years, developing countries have transferred large amount of resources to developed countries. In addition to 
this, private capital flows to developing countries are highly concentrated in a group of large middle-income 
countries and are particularly insufficient for low-income and small countries. Secondly, private capital flows to 
developing countries have been highly volatile and reversible; as a consequence, they have been a major factor 
in causing developmentally costly currency and financial crises. Rather than smooth domestic expenditure, 
private capital flows seem to have contributed to making it more volatile.
Average tariffs applied to agriculture and manufactures 
by selected countries, 1999-2001
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Most protected sectors, therefore, are precisely those that are of interest for 
developing countries (textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, fish and fish 
products). Tariff escalation is also present in non-agricultural goods, as evi-
denced by the fact that tariffs on semi-processed and processed raw materials 
are relatively high, thus discouraging diversification by commodity exporters.
“WORLD ECONOMY REGISTERED THE STRONGEST GROWTH IN OVER 
TWO DECADES” is the chapter title of a section in the 2004 European Central 
Bank Report. And continues: In 2004 the global economy had expanded at its 
fastest rate since 1976, with growth being relatively broad-based across the vari-
ous regions. Growth in the Asian region was particularly robust, with the Chinese 
economy showing signs of overheating. Strong global economic growth was 
supported by favourable financing conditions and stimulative macroeconomic 
policies in many countries. It was accompanied by a robust expansion of world 
trade, which in 2004, reached its highest level since 2000.
This excellent news from center-countries contrast with news from others. 
BBC News: “Life is worse for the world poorest”. Many of the world poor-
est countries are doing worse in 2005 than they were 15 years ago, a major 
UN report says.
The UNDP points out that the gap between the rich and the poor in the 
world is widening - and inequalities are increasing even within those poorer 
countries making progress.
The Guardian: “ […] the world richest 500 individuals have got a combined 
income that is greater than that of the poorest 416 million; and 2.5 billion people, 
or 40% of the world population, live on less than US$ 2 a day. Redistributing 
1.6% of the income of the richest 10% of the global population would provide 
the $ 300 billion dollar needed to lift the 1 billion people living on less than a 
dollar a day out of extreme poverty, at least temporarily […] poverty reduction 
requires dynamic processes allowing poor countries and their inhabitants to 
produce their way out of deprivation. This means scaling up aid, breaking down 
trade barriers and halting civil wars”. 
“The three richest people in the world have accumulated altogether a 
fortune that exceeds the GNPs of the 48 poorest countries, which is to say a 
quarter of all the states in the world” (Ramonet, 2004: 127).
In recent years, aid for post-conflict countries has ranged from US$ 245 
per capita in Bosnia and Herzegovina to just $ 40 dollar in Afghanistan. 
The United Nations inform that for every $ 1 dollar rich countries spend on 
aid, they allocate US$ 10 to military expenditure. Only the increase in defense 
expenditure since 2000, if devoted to aid instead, would be sufficient to reach 
the … UN target of spending 0.7% [of gross national income] on aid. Spending 
on HIV/Aids represents three days of military spending.
“The cost of meeting all the sanitary and nutritional needs of humankind 
would be 13 billion euro slightly more than what the citizens of the United States 
and Europe spend on perfume”. (Ramonet, 2004: 127)
UN Press decries what it calls perverse taxation, under which the world 
poorest countries face the highest tariffs in rich countries, and examines the 
impact on the poor of agricultural subsidies and protectionism in wealthy indus-
trialized nations. Donor countries, spend US$ 1 billion a year aiding agriculture 
in developing countries and US$1 billion a day on domestic subsidies that 
undermine the world poorest farmers. 
Progress in cutting the child mortality rate has slowed in the last decade. 
Three million children die of treatable diseases such as pneumonia and diarrhea 
every year. This is often due to lack of basic healthcare, and many deaths could 
be avoided by implementing simple, inexpensive measures.
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Unfortunately, other international institutions are only a representation of the cor-
relation of forces among their parent countries. If not, why do the UN General 
Assembly sole mandatory resolutions come from the Security Council, where 5 
powerful countries sit as permanent members and enjoy the veto privilege?
Own Think-Tanks
The level of economic development achieved in Asia-Pacific during the past 2 
decades and its growing importance in the global economy, plus the “Asian 
Tigers Crisis”, provides us with a paramount example for an analytic reasoning, 
taking into account the Malasian and China positive experience. The possibility 
to achieve, through research, an academic study with a high level of practical 
applicability to provide cognitive tools for intellectual emancipation, is extremely 
valuable. But, we must be our own think-tanks.
In this sense, it is important what Prabhatt Patnaik remarks: “Many fac-
tors have been highlighted, and rightly so, as underlying the high growth of the 
East Asian ‘tigers’ (some of which hold for Southeast Asia as well). These are: 
land reforms; the achievement of high levels of literacy; the economic conces-
sions (in the form inter alia of allowing substantial market access) made by the 
United States for geopolitical reasons to these countries, which were seen to 
be confronting communism. But an important additional factor, seldom noted, 
is the restraint placed on financial interests: the exclusion of international finan-
cial flows and the subordination of the domestic financial system to the needs 
Child mortaliti
Under five mortality rate per 1.000 live births, 1990 & 2003
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of the productive economy. This was in keeping with what was happening 
elsewhere in the third world and with the reduced weight of financial interests 
in the advanced capitalist countries themselves, which underlay the postwar 
boom” (1999: 2).
Being Aware
South countries must be prepared for the changes that the global eco-
nomic system will suffer8. The present path of the US economy and its currency 
will precipitate a domestic as well as a global recession. It cannot only curtail 
this deficit by depreciating the dollar, since, apart from being difficult to achieve 
in a world with market determined exchange rates, this will induce inflationary 
pressures, and entail wealth losses, both of which will jeopardize the position 
of the dollar as the reserve currency and threaten the stability of the system 
as a whole. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is trying to achieve the same end, of 
reducing its current account deficit, by coercing Asian economies like China to 
revalue their currencies upwards with whom it has substantial current deficits.
The new phase of imperialism in short has brought the system to the brink 
of a major crisis.
The financial bubble can drown the real economy upon which it is based 
and which is its reason of being. In spite of its aparent self-sufficiency, what 
actually circulates through the financial markets are only securities created by 
the real economy (labour and intellectual work), since stocks, bonds or any 
other financial tools only represent the values of the companies or assets in 
general. These tools are only bonds without intrinsic value. Financial specula-
tion, however, can deviate completely the real interests inherent to the growth 
of a certain economy.
And yet what is remarkable about the new phase of imperialism is that 
it justifies the adoption of neo-liberal policies on behalf of eliminating poverty9. 
State sector assets are privatized in the name of improving efficiency which is 
supposed to usher in faster growth and eliminate poverty.
The DFI did not decrease in the years 2000 and 2001; on the contrary, 
it increased and raised the full weight of the transactions all around the world. 
Transnational investment allocates 90% of its resources to the merger and ac-
quisition of existing companies, and merely a 10% to the creation of new facilities 
or to expand production capacity. This is, for each 10 dollars in Foreign Direct 
Investment, only 1 is used for production and for the creation of jobs. 
In this scenario the question is whether capitalism will have the ability to 
leave behind the magnitude of this Depression. On the one hand, the answer will 
be dependant on the existence of suitable conditions to encourage economic 
growth under the present economic rationality. If these conditions did not exist, 
it would imply not only a crisis in the neoliberalism itself, but in the capitalistic 
rationality as a whole.
8 According to a research carried out by the Federal Reserve, 18 out of 25 underdeveloped countries have suf-
fered financial crises. In all the cases, the crises were preceded by the liberalization of the financial markets, 
some time within the previous 5 years.
9 Orthodox economic analysis has argued that trade liberalization has a positive effect on resource allocation 
and economic growth. The assumptions underlying orthodox theories are perfect competition, full employment 
of resources, and constant returns to scale in production. However, the real world is more complex — with 
market imperfections, high levels of unemployment and underemployment and economies of scale in many 
branches of industrial production worldwide. A economist as remarkable as Paul Samuelson has questioned the 
assumption that liberalization always has a benign outcome. As he pointed out recently “it is dead wrong about 
the necessary surplus of winnings over losings” (Samuelson, 2004). In reality, unfettered trade liberalization 
has, at times, imposed heavy adjustment costs including output contraction, higher unemployment and deeper 
trade deficits (Ocampo and Taylor,1998, quoted in UN 2005).
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The answer, basically, will depend on the capability of capitalism to set 
aside speculative investment, which is unproductive and redistributive, and 
head towards production. Measures like Tobin Tax, for example, which control 
or tax flows of capital in the speculative area, are certainly necessary but not 
enough. Investment in the productive field will only come when a production 
profit is guaranteed. Without an increase in the profit margin, a reflux of capital 
towards the productive field is not likely to happen.
Academicians must develop a critical stance and evaluate the prevailing 
theories and paradigms. This will be achieved when, by Alternative trends, the 
peripheral countries analyse what is actually happening. This analysis is es-
sential in order to reach an appropriate diagnosis, thus being able to carry out 
common strategies with other southern nations. 
“Until lions have their own historians, 
the tales of the hunt will always glorify the hunter”
(African proverb)
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